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III
LAW GOVERNING MEETING OF MINDS
A question may arise whether there was in legal contemplation a
meeting of minds. Suppose that A in New York makes an offer to B
in Germany by mail, and that he revokes it by cable after B has received
the letter containing the offer. Under the German law A is bound by
his offer if it is accepted within the period within which A would under
ordinary circumstances expect an answer.
56 If the transmission of a
letter between New York and Germany takes two weeks B could accept
the offer by cable at any time before the expiration of the two weeks
after the receipt of the offer. Under the law of New York A is not bound
by his offer and can withdraw it at any time before it is accepted. If B
accepts the offer within the period mentioned, has a contract been
formed? It has been said that the offeror is deemed present in the
state in which his offer has been received, and the conclusion has been
drawn that A's duty to keep his offer open should be governed in the
above case by German law.5 7  Such a deduction involves, however, a
process of reasoning that starts from a false premise. If the law of
the forum regards the contract as made in the state from which the
acceptance is sent, in our case, Germany, the consequences will be the
same, of course, as if A had made the offer in person in Germany. But
the preliminary question, where the .contract was made, is actually
decided by the law of the forum without reference to the German law.
If the German law had been consulted the contract would have been
made in New York.58 For the same reason the law of the forum must
determine, in accordance with its own views, the preliminary question
regarding the binding nature of an offer. There is no more reason
why the court should consult German law on this point than there was
in determining the situs of the contract. These preliminary questions
* Continued from 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 565, 655.
German Civil Code, See. 147.
Hibbert, International Private Law (1918) 130; Cohen, Des Contrats par
Correspondance en Droit Frangais en Droit Anglais et en Droit Anglo-An.ricain
(1921) 178.
According to German law the contract is not deemed made until the letter of
acceptance reaches the offeror. I Staudinger, Kommentar sum Biirgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, (7th & 8th eds. 1912) 567.
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must in the nature of things be determined by each court in accordance
with its own law,59 except perhaps where a contract is concluded between
two foreign states or nations whose laws agree on the subject.6 The
other possible alternative, that of requiring compliance with the law of
both states under all circumstances, does not commend itself because it
restricts too greatly the formation of contracts from an international
point of view.
IV
LAW GOVERNING THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS
If the validity of the contract and of its provisions is admitted and
the question relates to the rights, duties, etc., arising out of such a
contract, i. e. its effects, there can be no doubt that the intention of the
parties is the controlling factor. The parties are perfectly free to
agree upon the nature of the contract, its effect, its performance, and
the consequences resulting from non-performance, so far as dispositive
provisions of law are concerned, that is, provisions in regard to which
the parties have full freedom to contract. If the parties have clearly
expressed themselves on the subject, the matter is free from difficulty,
and is simply one of interpretation or proof. Where the parties have
defined their rights, duties, etc., however, by reference to some partic-
ular foreign law, a question may arise whether they should be allowed
absolute freedom in the selection of such law, or whether they should
be limited in their choice to the law of the countries that have an actual
connection with the contract."'
If the parties have not expressed themselves regarding the law that
shall determine the extent of their rights, duties, etc., their intention
may appear from the terms of the contract in the light of surrounding
circumstances. However expressed, the actual will of the parties
controls.6 2
What is to be done, however, in the ordinary case where it is apparent
that the parties did not think at all about the legal effect of their
contract? In such cases the law may take one of two courses. It may
content itself with adopting the general rule that the law of the state
with which the contract has the closest connection shall control, 63 or it
may lay down more specific rules. The method which leaves the ques-
'Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20
CoL. L. REV. 247-282.
1 Id., 281.
As the parties must prove the foreign law, there would appear to be no good
reason why they should be restricted in their choice. Bustamante, La Autarquia
Personal (914) iio; i Rolin, Principes de Droit International Privi (I897)
437; 4 Weiss, Traiti de Droit Inte'national Privi (2d ed. 1912) 354.
.Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. i9o8) 529, 556.
' This appears to be essentially the practice of the English courts. Westlake
stated before the Institute of International Law that the English judges could
not be tied down by any presumption. 0904) 2o ANNuAiRE, I69.
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tion to the courts as a question of fact has the seeming advantage that
it permits the working out of justice in each particular case, but its
great weakness is that the parties cannot know before the decision of the
question by the courts what their rights under the contract are. As the
conclusion of the court will depend upon an appreciation of all the
surrounding circumstances, it is impossible to anticipate with any
degree of certainty the decision of a case. As an escape from this
situation, courts and legislatures have adopted subordinate rules of law
or presumptions. Courts and writers taking this view are agreed that
the law so chosen should be the law which the parties as reasonable men
probably would have intended to apply had their attention been directed
to the matter.64  But when it comes to the selection of the rule or rules
there is the greatest difference of opinion.
A. PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL LAW
(I) Common National Law. Many of the Italian and French
writers are of the opinion that, where the parties have the same nation-
ality and do not express their intention regarding the law that shall
control their rights, they tacitly contract with reference to their common
national law.65  They hold, therefore, that, whenever the facts of a case
do not point to a different conclusion, a presumption should exist in
favor of their leax patriae. These writers reach different conclusions,
however, concerning the presumption to be adopted if the parties do not
possess the same nationality. Some hold that the parties must have
contracted in such a situation with a view to the leax loci.66 Others are
of the opinion that if the parties have the same domicil it is more reason-
able to assume that they contracted with reference to that law, espe-
cially where it has been established a long. time.67 Still others make a
distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts, and submit the
former to the lex loci and the latter to the personal law of the debtor.68
Where the parties have no common nationality and no common domicil,
but one of the contracting parties has a domicil in the country to which
the other belongs, some writers believe that the law of the latter state
"Pillet, Principes de Droit International Privi (193o) 440.
Durand, Essai de Droit International Privi (1884) 420; Despagnet, Pricis de
Droit International Priv6 (5th ed. igog) 881-882; Jarass6, Essai sur la Substance
et les Effets des Conventions en Droit International Priv6 (1886) 58; 2 Laurent,
Le Droit Civil International (1881) 413-414; Surville et Arthuys, Coars Elbmen-
taire de Droit International Priv6 (6th ed. 1915) 298-299. Meili would apply
the common national law with the proviso that the parties at the time of contract-
ing were aware of their common nationality. 2 Meili, Das Internationale Civil
und Handelsrecht (1902) 16.
'Bard, Prcis de Droit International Pinal et Privi (1883) 266; Despagnet,
op. cit., 882; Durand, op. cit., 420; 2 Laurent, op. cit., 414-416.
'Jarass6, op. cit., 58; Surville et Arthuys, op. cit., 302; 3 Weiss, op. cit., 356.
asi Foelix, Traitj de Droit International Privi (4th ed. I866) 159, 227; I
Fiore, Le Droit International Privi (Antoine's transl. I9o7) 157. Contra:
Demangeat sur Foelix, 23o, note b; Despagnet, op. cit., 885-886;. Dreyfus, L'Acte
.uridique dans le Droit International Privi (1904) 303.
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expresses the probable intention of the parties.69 If the case does not
fall within any of the above classes, some writers prefer the law of the
place of performance to the law of the place of contracting, where the
contract had merely a casual connection with the lex loci contractus.70
(2) Common Domiciliary Law. Some writers contend that the
application of the leax patriae does not rest upon a reasonable basis.
They urge that contracts have nothing to do with national characteristics
or traditions, but belong exclusively to the economic life of an indi-
vidual, which centers about his domicil. Where the parties have not
expressed their intention it is reasonable to assume, therefore, according
to these writers, that they would have chosen the law of their common
domicil as the law governing their legal relations.71 Some writers
prefer the law of the common nationality if the common domicil was
not long established. 72  In the absence of a common domicil some
prefer the lea loci,73 while others raise a presumption in favor of the
lex patriae if the contracting parties have the same nationality, and
support the lex loci only if the parties have no common domicil or
nationality.7 ' Where the lex loci contractus has only an accidental
connection with the contract, some of the above writers would deter-
mine the rights of the parties with reference to the law of the place
of performance. 5
(3) Bustamante's View: Bustamante is of the opinion that an
unqualified preference should be given neither to the law of the common
nationality nor to that of the common domicil. Where the parties have
the same nationality and the same domicil and the contract is made in
one of these states, Bustamante thinks that the parties must-be deemed
to have contracted with reference to that law.76  In the same way, where
they have the same nationality, but different domicils, or the same domi-
cil but different nationalities, and the locus contractus is in the country
that is common to the parties, the presumption should be in favor of such
state. 77 Where the parties have the same nationality and the same
domicil and the contract is made in neither state nor country, Busta-
mante would choose the personal law in accordance with his view con-
Surville et Arthuys, op. cit., 302.
Id., 302.
'Asser, Elhments de Droit International Privi (Rivier's transl. 1884) 75;
Chausse (1897) 24 CLuXEr, I, 26; Jarass6, op. cit., 58; Pillet, Cours de Droit
International Priv6 (9o5) 325; Principes, 441; (19o8) 22 ANNUAIRE, 8o; I
Rolin, op. cit., 470-471, 511-514; Valery, Manuel de Droit International Privi
(1914) 985. In the absence of a common domicil some prefer the lex loci. Asser,
op. cit., 73, 75; Pillet, Cours, 327. Others, the common national law. i Rolin,
OP. cit., 470.
Audinet, Prncipes Eldimentaires du Droit International Privi (2d ed. 1906)
283; Bossion, Du Conflict des Lois en ce qui Concerne la Substance des Obliga-
tions Conventionnelles (1884) 188; Verdia, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Inter-
nacional Privado (19o8) 177-178; 4 Weiss, op. cit., 355-356.
" Pillet, Cours, 327; Principes 441; (1904) 2o ANNA IAE, 157.
*"Jarass6, op. cit., 58; I Rolin, op. cit., 470.
" Pillet (1904) 2o ANNUAmE, 157.
" Bustamante, op. cit., 142.
'Id., 143.
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cerning laws of internal public order which are personal as regards their
object.7 8 If the parties have neither a common nationality nor a
common domicil, Bustamante favors the application of the lex loci.7 9
(4) Law of Debtor's Domicil: A good many writers contend that if
the parties have not entered into an express stipulation as to the govern-
ing law, and their actual intention does not appear from the facts of the
case, they must be deemed to have contracted with a view to the law of
the debtor's domicil.80 In justification of this presumption, Bar alleges
the following :81
"In so far, however, as there is a question of the interpretation to be
put on the intention of the parties, we must unquestionably proceed
upon the footing, that every person expresses himself in accordance
with the law and the statutes which he knows, and has recourse there-
fore to the law to which he is personally attached. This rule of inter-
pretation is applied in cases of unilateral obligations or transactions,
especially in mortis causa settlements, even by those who propose to
construe contract obligations by the lex loci contractus, or by the law
which prevails at the place of performance.
Lastly, the view we have here maintained is supported by the fact
that in very many cases, and in particular where no other place of
performance is specially stipulated, the domicil of the debtor is the
place of performance, and that in by far the greater number of cases,
action to compel performance of a personal obligation, with a view to
the possibility of ultimate execution, is brought at the domicil of the
debtor."
B. LAW OF THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE
In this country and in Germany most courts and many writers,
following Story and Savigny,8 2 hold that, where there is no proof of
an actual intention, the parties must be deemed to have contracted with
reference to the law of the place of performance. This conclusion is
based by Savigny upon the theory that the parties, as reasonable men,
if they had thought of the matter, would have naturally chosen the law
of the place with which the contract had the most vital connection, and
this is deemed to be the law of the place of performance, because the
whole expectation of the parties is regarded as being directed to the
performance of the contract.83
1Id., 142-143.
"Id., I44.
Bar, Private International law (Gillespie's transl. 1892) 544; 1 Crome, op. cit.,
148 and note 44; Harburger (1902) ig ANNUAImE, 141; Kl6ppel (189o) ZEiT-
SCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT UND STRAFRECHT, 197; Neumann, Inter-
nationales Privatrecht (1896) 89; Reglesberger, Pandekten (1893) 174; 1
Stobbe, Deutsches Privatrecht (3d ed. 1893) :261; Windscheid, Pandekten (9th
ed. i9o6) 746.
" Bar, op. cit., 544.
' See supra, 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 574, 577.
U Accord: Algara, Lecciones de Derecho Internacional Privado (1899) 187;
Barazetti, Das Internationale Privatrecht im Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche fair das
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C. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING
Some of the English courts hold that the law of the country where
a contract is made governs its effects in the absence of anything to show
a contrary intention. 84 This presumption applies with special force
where the contract is made in England. Where the contract is made in
one country and is to be performed either wholly or partially in another,
great weight is given to the law of the place of performance, especially
as to the mode of performance."" A few states in this country also
apply the law of the place of contracting.""
So far as the lex loci is followed on the continent, it is usually given
a subordinate place, and is invoked only in the absence of a common
nationality or a common domicil,8 7 refuge being generally taken to the
law of the place of contracting only as a means of last resort. This
tendency is particularly noticeable in contracts by correspondence. In
this class of cases the lex loci is often ignored altogether, its place being
taken either by the law of the state from which the offer was
dispatched,88 by the law of the domicil of the offeror,8 9 or of the party
who took the preponderating part in the negotiations,90 or by the law
Deutsche Reich (1897) 55; Boyens (1898) 4 VERHANDLUNGEN DES 24 DEUT-
SCHEN JURISTENTAGES 112 ff.; Carrio, Apuntes de Derecho Internacional Privado
(1911) 187 if.; i Dernburg, Das Bilrgerliche Recht (3d ed. i9o6) ii; Ennecce-
rus, (1898) 4 VERHANDLUNGEN DES 24 DEUTCHEN JURISTENTAGES 85, 119;
Gerber, System des Deutschen Privatrechts (17th ed. 1895) 41; Gierke,
Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 231-232; Krohn, Die Vertragsobligationen in
Materieller Beziehung nach Deutschen Internationalen Privatrecht (igog) 92.
"Jacobs v. Cridit Lyonnais (1884, C. A.) L.R. 12. Q. B. Div. 589. Contracts
of affreightment are presumed to be entered into with reference to the law of the
flag. Lloyd v. Guibert (1865) L. R. i Q. B. 115.
" Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Co. [189', C. A.] I Q. B. 79; Hamlyn v.
Talisker Distillery [1894, H. L.] A. C. 2o2; Dicey, op. cit., 565-566.
"Beale,'What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract II (iio) 23 HARv. L.
REv. 194, 207.
" See supra, 30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 567-57o. This is especially true of the
French and Italian writers. Compare, I F6rster-Eccius, Preussisches Privatrecht
(7th ed. I896) 62; Niemeyer, op. cit., (1895) 241; (1899) 3 DEUTSCHE JUtIs-
TENZErrUNG 373; Schdffner, Entwickelung dds Internationalen Privatreehts (1841)
lO8-1o9; Vareilles-Sommi~res, La Synthkse du Droit International Priv6 (1897)
228.
' Japan, Art. 9, Law concerning the Application of Laws in, General; De
Becker, International Private Law of Japan (1919) 98. If, however, the recipient
of the offer was ignorant, at the time of his acceptance, of the place from which
the offer had been despatched, the place of the offeror's domicil is regarded as
the place of the act. Ibid.
'Cass. Turin, Jan. 13, 1891, (1891) 18 CLnUNmE, io26. Institute of Interna-
tional Law (1908) 22 ANNUAIRE, 291. Where the original offer is modified in
the course of the negotiations, the law of the domicil of the party making the
last offer governs. Neumann, op. cit., 6, sec, 15, 86.
Surville (i89i) I8 CLUNET, 371.
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of the state which would postpone the formation of the contract long-
est,9' or by some other law. 2
The above rules are laid down generally as prima facie'presumptions
or as mere guides for the courts, in the absence of an express agreement
regarding the governing law or of circumstances from which a contrary
intention may be inferred. Whenever the parties have chosen a parti-
cular law, or the court is satisfied that if they had thought of the matter,
they would probably have contracted, as reasonable men, with reference
to some other law than that pointed out by the prima facie presumption,
such law will control. In this country there is a tendency to regard the
le% loci contractus and the lex loci solutionis as fixed rules of law, for
in the great majority of cases the courts do not inquire into the atten-
dant circumstances.
The practical advantages and disadvantages of the presumptions
above mentioned have been indicated in the main in the discussion of the
intrinsic validity of contracts. So far as this country is concerned, only
three of the above ules are entitled to serious consideration, viz. the
law of the common domicil of the parties, the law of the place of per-
formance, and the law of the place of execution. The adoption of the
law of the common nationality of the parties would be absolutely imprac-
ticable. Even in continental countries in which the principle of nation-
ality has been accepted in the conflict of laws, it is realized that its
application to the law of contracts is unwarranted in view of the fact
that contracts affect the economic life of a person, which has little if
anything to do with nationality. The lex domicilii of the debtor also,
suggested by Bar, is unacceptable, for there would appear to be no
reason why the law of the debtor's domicil should be preferred to that
of the creditor. Of the remaining rules, the law of the common
domicil of the parties has no support in this country, although a good
deal might be said in its favor, except for the special conditions pre-
vailing here. On the continent the domicil of the party is the center
of his affairs.93  With us it is .a person's home and very frequently the
home is in a different state from a person's place of business. With us
a person has, not infrequently, residences in different states, or he may
have a residence in- one state and his domicil in another, the result
being that the determination 'of the domicil of the parties is often a
' Bartin (1897) 24 CLUNET, 476; Chritien (1891) 18 CLUNET, 1028; Dreyfus,
op. cit., 363.
For example, according to Ferron, the law of the place to which the offer is
addressed should be applied as the law of the place where the offer is in fact made.
The author contends that making an offer by mail is the same as if the offeror
were physically present in the state to which the letter is sent (19Ol) 5o REVUE
CRrriQuE, 429-43o. A. Cohen, the latest writer on the subject, concludes that it
is impossible to choose a definite law and that the governing law should be the
one which the parties would probably have preferred in the light of all the attend-
ant circumstances. Des Contrats par Correspondence en Droit Frangais, en
Droit Anglais et en Droit Anglo-Amricain (1921) 178.
" See Lorenzen, op. cit., 2o CoL. L. REv. 248.
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matter of great difficulty. Because of these practical considerations
our courts have rejected the lex domicilii even as regards capacity to
contract, with respect to which it has been the traditional rule on the
continent for centuries.
9 4
In this country opinion has been divided between the law of the place
of performance and that of the place where the contract was executed,
the majority of the courts supporting the former rule. Where the place
of performance is agreed upon or appears with certainty from the
contract, the adoption of the lex loci solutionis furnishes a simple and
certain rule.9 5 It loses these characteristics, however, when the place
of performance is not indicated and has to be inferred from attendant
circumstances96 or to be derived from particular rules of law.97 With
respect to bilateral contracts, in which each party has agreed to perform
in a different state, the lex loci solutionis cannot be consistently applied
at all, for it would logically require that the duties of each party be
subject to the law of the place in which he agreed to perform, and thus
cause essentially dependent promises to be subject to different laws.
Our courts do not seem to have faced this problem, which becomes most
acute in the law of sales, and have avoided it in this class of cases by
abandoning the lex loci solutionis for the law of the place where the
title of the chattel passes.98 An application of the law of the place of
performance of each party to a bilateral contract may lead to discrepant
results. For example, the law of the buyer's place of performance may
throw the risk of the subject matter sold on the buyer, while the law of
the seller's place of performance may throw it on the seller. Again,
one party may be entitled to demand performance by virtue of the law
of the place of performance of the other contracting party, while he
may not be bound at all according to the law of his place of perform-
ance. The German courts and writers have made -the most strenuous
efforts to extricate themselves from this embarrassing situation. Bar,
who argues this question from the standpoint of the law of the debtor's
domicil, makes the following observations in regard to the question of
risk :99
"To-day the law of nationality has been commonly substituted for that of
domicil.
" Mitteis, 4 VERHANDLUNGEN DES 24 JURISTENTAGES, 103; Pillet. (19o4) 2o
ANNUAME, 154; Valery, op. cit., 98x. According to Story also, if no place of
performance is indicated, or the contract may indifferently be performed anywhere,
the contract ought to be referred to the lex loci contractus. Story, Conflict of
Laws (8th ed. 1883) 381.
" Concermng the ascertainment of the lex loci solutionis, see Minor, Conflict of
Laws (goi) 377, 378; Story, OP'. cit., 381-383.
"' See, for example, German Civil Code, sec. 269. The "place of performance"
is a difficult and complicated legal term. Niemeyer, Vorschliige und Materialien
(1895) 24I; (1898) 3 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG, 373; 2 Zitelmann, Interna-
tionales Privatrecht (1912) 372.
"Ladd v. Dulany (i8o9, C. C. D. C.) i Cranch, C. C. 583; Kline v. Baker
(1868) 99 Mass. 253; Jaffray v. Wolf (895) 4 Okl. 303, 47 Pac. 496; McIlvaine
v. Legarg (1884) 36 La. Ann. 359.
"Bar, op. cit., 546.
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"We have, however, precisely the same difficulty if two express provi-
sions at variance with each other find their way into a contract, and no
interpretation sought from other circumstances avails to give exclusive
validity to the one or to the other. The decision must be in favor of the
defender, since the pursuer has certainly not made out his case."
Windscheid also, who, like Bar, accepts the lex domicilii of the debtor in
lieu of the law of the place of performance, would apparently reach the
same result by granting to the debtor in all cases an option to rely either
upon his own law or upon that of the creditor. He says :1
"As, however, the creditor is the person who is the claimant, he must,
in order that he may recover anything, accept the law of the debtor's
domicil, if he, the debtor, insists upon the application of this law; but
conversely the law of his, the creditor's own domicil, may have to be
taken, if it suits the debtor to appeal to it."
Speaking of the case where one party is entitled to demand perform-
ance by virtue of the-law of the place of performance of the other
contracting party when he is not bound at all by the law of his own place
of performance, Bar says :2
"But in every contract the undertaking of the one party depends upon
that of the other; the one has only validly bound himself in so far as
the other is bound to carry out his undertaking. He can, therefore,
if he is called upon to do his part, demand that the other party shall
either do his first (if this is sufficient, as it often is, to bar any subse-
quent challenge of the transaction), or bind himself in some way that
is recognized by the law of his domicil. If, however, the party who is
truly bound has already performed his part, and if, by the law of the
domicil of the other party, it is not enough for the validity of the
contract that the performance so made has been accepted, then all that is
left is an action to recover what has passed. (Condictio indebiti sine
causa in Roman law.) Most cases, however, will not turn upon this
question, but upon whether the party who has already done, or alleges
that he has done, his part, shall be satisfied with the minus, which is all
that the law of the other party allows him."
Other writers attempt to get out of the predicament by applying the
law of the party whose performance plays the more important role in
the particular class of cases.3 In the matter of sales the law of the
seller has been preferred on that ground.4 Zitelmann would apply the
national law of both parties whenever the fact in question concerns both
alike.5 Others, realizing that all of the above solutions are mere expe-
dients which prove the unfitness of the lex loci solutionis with respect
to bilateral contracts, abandon it in this class of cases in favor of the
lex loci.6
Windscheid, Pandekten (9th ed. 19o6) 146.
Bar, op. cit., 546.
'Enneccerus (I898) 4 VERHANDLUNGEN DES 24 DEUTSCHEN JURISTFNrAGES,
9o; Krohn, op. cit., 94. See also Bar (19o2) ig ANNUAI, 142-143.
'Harburger (19o2) I9 ANNUAME, 142-143.
'2 Zitelmann, op. cit., 411.
'Neumann, op. cit., 91.
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The law of the place of performance is equally unavailable in two
other classes of cases. One of these is where an indivisible contract
is to be performed in different states.7  The second class of cases
relates to contracts which are to be performed in one of several places
at the option of the promisor. The law of the place of performance
cannot govern in such a case if the promisor fails to perform in either
place.
The lex loci also, as has been shown above,8 is not free from objec-
tions. It has been criticized especially with respect to contracts by cor-
respondence, a class of contracts which is very important from the stand-
point of the conflict of laws. As a matter of legal theory it is without
question objectionable to have the rights of parties determined by the law
of a particular state simply because the last act to make it a binding
contract occurred in that state. If A, a business man in Connecticut,
makes an offer to B in New York City, B being a resident of New
Jersey, and B forgets to mail the letter of acceptance until he is in New
Jersey, it would seem as if the contract should be governed either by
the law of New York or by that of Connecticut, but the logical applica-
tion of the lex loci requires in this country that the law of New Jersey
govern the rights of the parties. The following substitutes for the lex
loci have been suggested, among others, in this class of cases: (i) the
law of the domicil of the offeror; (2) the law of the place where the
offer was made, if such place appeared from the letter or was otherwise
known; (3) the law of the party controlling the negotiations; (4)
the law of the state which postpones the formation of the contract
longest.9
A new method for the solution of the problem before us has been
proposed by A. Rolin'0 and approved by the Institute of International
Law at its session in Florence in 19o8. Instead of finding the point of
contract exclusively either in the personal law of the parties, in the le:
loci contractus, or in the lex loci solutionis, it is derived from the nature
of the contract, the relative condition of the parties, and the situs of the
property. The conclusions reached by the Institute are embodied in
the following resolutions :"'
Art. i. The effect of. contractual obligations is determined by the
law to which the parties have manifested their intention to submit them-
selves, in so far as the validity of the obligation and its effects are not
opposed to the laws which control the contract absolutely, particuilarly as
regards personal capacity, formalities, intrinsic validity, or public policy.
Art. 2. If the parties have not expressed a real intention to accept
" Where the contract is divisible, it may be regarded as a separate contract with
reference to each state, so that the law of the place of performance could be
applied. Minor, op. cit., 380.
" Supra 3o YALE LAw JouRNAL, 663.
' Supra note 91, at p. 58.
10 (i9o8) 22 ANNUAIME, 86-89.
" Id., 289-292. Art. 2, subdiv. e-h, and i, and Art. 4 have been somewhat
condensed.
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a certain law as a suppletory law, that is to say, as a law intended to
fill the gaps in their contracts, to the extent that they are free to deter-
mine such effects, the determination of the law to be applied as a supple-
tory law shall be derived from the nature of the contract, from the rela-
tive condition of the parties, or from the situs of the property.
Thus there will be applied:
(a) With respect to contracts made at an exchange, at fairs or at
public markets, the law of the place of contracting.
(b) With respect to contracts affecting immovables, the law of the
situs of the immovables.
(c) With respect to gratuitous contracts, the law of the domicil of
him who confers the gratuity or renders the gratuitous service (gift,
loan without interest, gratuitous agency or bailment, suretyship, etc.).
(d) With respect to commercial sales made between a merchant and
a non-merchant, or between a merchant and another merchant, provided
it does nof constitute a commercial act on the part of the buyer, and
excepting the case provided for under (a), the law of the place in
which the commercial establishment of the seller is located.
(e) With respects to contracts for service, labor, public works, or
supplies for a state, province, county or a public institution, the law of
such state, province, etc.
(f) With respect to contracts of insurance, the law of the seat of
the company.
(g) .With respect to contracts entered into with a person exercising
a profession regulated by law (physicians, lawyers, etc.), and which
relate to such profession, the law of the place where such profession is
exercised.
(h) With respect to contracts of service entered into between labor-
ers or employees and a corporation, partnership, or merchant, the law
of the seat of such corporation, partnership, or commercial establish-
ment.
(i) With respect to bills and notes, the law of the place where each
contract is entered into, or, if such place be not mentioned in the instru-
ment, that of the domicil of the* obligor.
(j) With respect to contracts of carriers, forwarders, etc., the law.
of the principal establishment.
Art. 3- If the determination of the applicatory law, when the parties
are silent, can not be derived from the nature, of the contract, nor from
the relative condition of the parties nor from the situs of the property,
the judge will take into account the law of their common domicil; in
default of a common domicil, their common national law; and if they
have neither a common domicil nor a common nationality, the law of the
place of contracting.
Art. 4. If the contract has been concluded by correspondence, the
lex loci contractus shall not be taken into consideration and the law of
the domicil of the commercial establishment of the offeror shall be
applied.
The same law shall apply where the contract is concluded by tele-
phone. If the question from whom the offer proceeds can not be deter-
mined, the law of the common domicil, of common nationality, or
subsidiarily, that of the domicil of the debtor shall be applied.
Art. 5. With respect to the mode of execution, counting, weighing
and measuring, to default, holidays, and the validity of payment, tender
and deposit, the law and the usages of the place of performance shall
be applied.
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Art. 6. When the effect of the contract depends upon the sense of
certain terms used to designate the price, the weight, the measure, the
period and time of payment, reference shall be had in general to the
terminology of the place of performance, unless it appears from the
circumstances, and especially from the object of the contract, that the
parties actually used them in a different sense.
Art. 7. Notwithstanding the above presumptions a manifestation of
the real will of the contracting parties, even though it be tacit, shall
prevail.
If a uniform law were to be drawn up for the United States, the
method followed by the Institute might be found practicable and advan-
tageous. Some of the conclusions reached would require modification
in view of the conditions prevailing in this country, but the principle
that the subsidiary rule should have reference to the nature of the
contract, to the situation of the parties, and to the situs of the property,
would appear to be theoretically sound. There is doubt, however,
whether a classification of legal transactions along the lines suggested is
practicable in a country like ours, where the business organization has
assumed to a very large extent an interstate character. However this
may be, the method is clearly not a judicial one. It requires a survey
of the whole field of contracts and the mode in which the business is
conducted, and this cannot be done in a judicial proceeding.
The problem before our courts is therefore the following: Shall one
or more prima facie presumptions be adopted, which are to be displaced
whenever the courts are satisfied that the parties would probably have
contracted with reference to another law had they been aware of the
question, or shall they adopt one or more subsidiary rules of law which
shall control in the absence of evidence showing an actual intention of
the parties to contract with reference to some other law? The writer is
satisfied that the second method is the preferable one. The strongest
argument in favor of the first method is that it will correspond more
nearly with the presumed intention of the parties. It is submitted,
however, that it does not so operate in actual practice. The writer
has examined the decisions of the English, French, and German
courts and has found that in the great majority of cases when
the contract was connected at all with the state in which the court sat,
the parties were deemed to have contracted with reference to the law of
the forum. In arriving at this conclusion the courts often attributed
decisive importance to facts which there is every reason to believe would
not have been controlling in the minds of the parties. The uncertainty
to which this mode of solving the problem gives rise, preventing the
parties as it does from knowing their rights before a judicial determin-
ation of the question, makes it advisable that a definite rule be adopted
which shall control where the actual intention of the parties cannot be
ascertained. 1 2 The nature of such a rule will vary in the nature of
13 Catellani, II Dirito Internazionale Privato e suoi Recenti Progressi (1888)
577.
VALIDITY AND EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS
things with respect to the different classes of coutracts. As regards
contracts of affreightment, for example, it might be the law of the flag.'
s
With respect to ordinary contracts the lex loci contractus and the lex
loci solutionis contend for preference, the advantages and disadvantages
of which have been set forth above. The writer is of the opinion that a
compromise between the two will afford perhaps the best solution possi-
ble of the problem. He would suggest, therefore, that the effects of
contracts be determined by the law of the place of performance if a
place of performance is specified, and by the law of the place of contract-
ing if a place of performance is not specified.
There is a final question of a general character which requires an
answer. It is this: Are all the effects of a contract to be governed by
the same law, or may they be subject to different laws? As to the mode
of performance, courts and writers are agreed that it is good policy to
allow business to be carried on in the usual mode unless the parties have
stipulated to the contrary.' 4 It would be inconvenient if, for example,
the details of presentment, protest, and notice had to comply with the
local law governing each contract on a bill or note.' 5 A bank may have
thousands of such instruments falling due on the same day, and it
would be awkward, to say the least, if the law of the foreign countries
in which the instruments were drawn or indorsed had to be satisfied in
the above respects. For similar reasons it is held that the mode of
delivery, the mode of payment,' 6 and other similar incidents of perform-
ance should be controlled by the law of the place of performance.
Most courts and authors hold also that, when the effect of a contract
depends upon the meaning of certain terms used to designate the weight,
the measure, or the period and time of payment, reference should be
had to the terminology of the place where the performance is to take
place, unless it appears from the circumstances that the parties actually
used them in a different sense.'7  If a bill of exchange is drawn on
Mexico for a sum expressed in dollars, it is convenient to hold that the
instrument calls for Mexican dollars.'8 If a bill is drawn on a country
"3 Lloyd v. Gwibert (1865) L. R. I Q. B. 1l5.
" Dicey, op. cit., 563; Foote, Private International Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1914)
424; Bard, op. cit., 269; Diena, Principi (igio) 245; Meili, op. cit., 525; 2 id.,
543; Valery, op. cit., 993; 4 Weiss, op. cit., 389.
"See Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (1919) 150-155.
"Dicey, op. cit., 566; Foote, op. cit., 425; Asser, op. cit., 74-75; Bard, op. cit.,
269; 3 Catellani, op. cit., 568; Despagnet, op. cit., 916-9i8; Champcormmunal
(I896) 45 REvUE CRITIQUE, 590; Esperson (1882) 9 CLUNET, 273; Jettel, Hand-
buch des Internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts (1893) io8; Meili, op. cit.,
(Kuhn's transi. I9o5), 326; Pillet (1896) 23 CLUNET, 15; Renault, (1884) 33
RE vUE CRTIQUE, 717; Surville et Arthuys, op. cit., 336; 4 Weiss, op. cit., 389.
Contra: Audinet, op. cit., 301; Dreyfus, op. cit., 370; Cf. 2 Rolin, op. cit., 543-
544-
,,2 Rolin, op. cit., 548.
SBar, op. cit., 674; Esperson, Diritto Cantbiario Internazionale (187o) 97; I
Fiore, op. cit., 223; I Mass6, Le Droit Commercial dans ses Rapports avec le
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having still the old calendar, it is reasonable to calculate the day of
maturity according to the calendar in use where the instrument is paya-
ble.19
There is much authority also for the proposition that all matters
relating to the performance of a contract, or to the consequences
resulting from non-performance, should be governed by .the law of the
place of performance, irrespective of the law governing the effects of
contracts in general. On this point there is, however, much diversity of
opinion. The older view was that matters relating to the performance
of a contract should be determined by the law of the place of perform-
ance. On the continent the names of' Bartolus, Foelix, and Fiore"
are most prominently connected with this view. Induced probably by a
desire to reconcile certain passages of the Corpus Juris Civilis, some of
which were deemed to demand the application of the law of the place of
contracting, and others, the law of the place of performance, Bartolus
made a distinction between the natural consequences of a contract, i. e.,
the consequences which arise out of the contract itself, in regard to
which the law of the place of contracting would control, and the conse-
quences Which arise ex post facto from negligence or delay in perform-
ance, which would be controlled by the law of the place of perform-
ance. If the place of performance was not specified in the contract,
Bartolus applied the law of the forum, which he regarded as the place
where such negligence or delay occurred.
2 0
Foelix maintains that the law of the place of contracting should deter-
mine the "effects" of a cofitract, while the "consequences" thereof
should be governed by the law of the place of performance. The
"effects" of a contract, according to Foelix, arise from the very nature
of a contract and are the rights, duties, etc., which the parties positively
intended to create. The "consequences" of a contract, on the other
hand, are, according to this writer, the rights, duties, etc., which the
legislator created in coftnection with the performance of the contract.
They do not inhere in the contract, but result from events arising subse-
Droit des Gens et le Droit Civil (1844) 546; 2 Rolin, op. cit., 543. Contra:
Champcommunal (1894) 8 AITNALES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL Pt. II. 208; Chr~tien,
Principes de Droit International Public (1893) 153; 4 Lyon-Caen et Renault,
Trait6 de Droit Commercial (4th ed. 19o6-1914) 262.
" Bar, op. cit., 675; Esperson, op. cit., 89; 2 Griinhut, Wechselrecht (1897)
585, 4 Lyon-Caen et Renault, op. cit., 563; I Mass6, op. cit., 570-571; Nouguier,
Les Lettres de Change (4th ed. 1875) no. 1428; 4 Weiss, oP: cit., 465-466; cf. 3
Diena, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale Internazionale (905) 144-146; Otto-
lenghi, La Cambiale del Diritto Internazionale (1902) 265-266. Contra: Audinet,
op. cit., 614; Bettelheim, Das Internationale Wechselrecht Oesterreichs (1904)
167; Champcommunal, (1894) 8 ANNALES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, pt II, 201;
Chr6tien, op. cit., 142; Despagnet, op. cit., 994; 2 Jetta, La Substance des Obliga-
tions dans le Droit International Priv (1907) 81, 111; Surville et Arthuys, op. cit.,
725.
"Bartolus, Conflict of Laws (Beale's transl. 1914) 18-20.
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quent to its formation.2 Foelix included among the "consequences"
the mode of performance, the effect of negligence, what constitutes
default or non-performance, the amount of damages resulting from
such default or non-performance, and the ratification of voidable con-
tracts. 22  He holds that an action for rescission by the seller for non-
payment of the price results from the contract itself, and is governed,
therefore, by the leX loci,2s while an express stipulation that the contract
shall be ipso facto terminated upon non-payment of the purchase price
relates to the consequences of the contract and is governed, therefore,
by the law of the place of performance.
24
Fiore makes a distinction between the vinculum juris of a contract
(id quod actum est), by which he means its intrinsic validity, substance
and extent of the obligation, which should be subject, in his opinion, in
the absence of a common nationality, to the law of the place of contract-
ing, and the onus conventionis (id quod in obligatione est), by which
he means the performance or mode of performance of the contract,
which he determines with reference to the law of the place of perform-
ance. 25  The: question whether the defendant is responsible in case of
culpa or dolus, accident or vis major, or whether the plaintiff is entitled
to specific performance or to damages concerns, according to Fiore, the
id quod actum est.26 On the other hand, the question whether fault,
negligence, accident, or default exists, 27 or whether in the case of a sale
the seller or the buyer has to bear the expense incident to delivery,28
concerns the id quod in obligatione est and is subject, therefore, to the
law of the place of performance.
Ever since Lord Mansfield's dictum in Robinson v. Bland,29 the
English and American courts have been inclined to determine the effects
of contracts by the law of the place of performance, so that the problem
now discussed has not been clearly before the courts.30 There are
dicta, however, that matters relating to performance are subject to the
law of the place of performance without reference to the law govern-
ing the effects of contracts in general. The Supreme Court of the
United States gave expression to this view in a celebrated dictum in the
case of Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago, in which it said :31




23I Fiore, op. cit., 184-186; Elementi di Diritto Internazionale Privato 09o5)
355; 2o ANNUAIRE, 175-177.
I Fiore, Le Droit International Priv , 186; Elementi, 385.
i Fiore, Droit ist., 187; Elementi, 355.
(19o4) 2o ANNUAiRE, 176-177.
(176o, K. B.) 2 Burr. io8i.
" "The place at which each party to a bill or note undertakes that he himself
vill pay it, is with regard to him the lex loci contractus, according to which his
liability is governed." Mayne, Damages (9th ed. 192o) 275.
21 (1875) g U. S. 406, 412.
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"Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regu-
lated by the law prevailing at the place of performance."
Professor Beale accepts this statement with the modification that the
effect of contracts is to be governed by the law of the state where the
effect is to take place.3 2 In support of the statement regarding the
effect of contracts, he relies upon the cases of Greenwald & Co. v.
Kaster,3 3 Waverly Natl Bank v. Hall,34 Abt v. Bank,35 and Hamlin v.
Talisker Distillery Co.3 6 These cases, it is submitted, do not bear out
the proposition in support of which they are cited.
In the case of Greenwald v. Kaster, Eckhouse and Kaster contracted
a debt as partners in Pennsylvania. Suit was brought for the recovery
of the debt in Pennsylvania, and judgment was taken against Kaster.
Plaintiff subsequently released Eckhouse on the debt in Indiana. All
the case held was that the effect of the release of Eckhouse on Kaster's
liability should be determined by the law of the state in which the origi-
nal debt was incurred, and the judgment was obtained. In the case of
Waverly National Bank v. Hall, a loan of money had been made to a
person about to embark in business, in consideration of a share of the
profits. The loan was made in Pennsylvania, but the business was to be
conducted in New York, and the question was whether there was, under
the contract, a liability as partners with respect to third parties. The
court held that the question was governed by the law of New York.
This conclusion was reached by adopting Story's view that the law of
the place of performance controls the validity, nature, obligation and
interpretation of contracts whenever such law differs frcm the law of
the place of contracting. By way of caution, however, the learned
court added :37 "All agree that matters connected with the performance
of a contract are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of per-
formance." There is nothing in the opinion of the court suggesting
that the effect of a contract is to be governed by a special law. In
Abt v. Bank the court held that the question whether the drawing of a
draft would operate as an assignment pro tanto of the drawer's funds
in the hands of the bank was controlled by the law of the state in which
the bank was located. Of the cases cited by Professor Beale, this is
the only one which might be regarded as lending color to his statement
that the effect of contracts is to be controlled by the law of the place
where such effect occurs. But it is manifest that the case decides only
a special problem arising in the law of bills of exchange. and that it does
not determine anything concerning the effect of contracts in general.
23 Beale, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (19o7) 543.
(1878) 86 Pa. 45.
' (1892) i5o Pa. 466, 24 Atl. 665.
"(1896) 159 Ill. 467, 42 N. E. 856.
[I894, H. L.] A. C. 2o2.
21 (1892) 15o Pa. 466, 473, 24 Atl. 665, 666.
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In the English case of Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery a contract
had been -entered into in England which was performed in Scotland.
The contract provided that any dispute arising out of it should be
settled by two members of the London Corn Exchange. In the instant
case the House of Lords thought "that the language of the arbitration
clause indicated very clearly that the parties intended that the rights
under that clause should be determined according to the law of Eng-
land," and concluded accordingly that the clause was valid and would
oust the jurisdiction of the Scotch courts. This case shows merely that
where parts of a contract are to be performed in different countries the
performance of the different parts may be subject to different laws.
The notion that all matters connected with the performance of a
contract should be subject to the law of the place of performance without
reference to the law governing the contract as such and the rights and
duties arising therefrom appears to be very plausible at first sight, and
so far as the mode of performance is concerned, the les loci solutionis
should control for obvious reasons of convenience. As to matters
connected with the performance of a contract in other respects, the
question becomes, however, upon closer examination, more difficult.
Many able minds have addressed themselves to the solution of the
problem, on the continent, but they have found it impossible to draw a
clear line of division between the rights and duties arising from the
formation of the contract as such, and those connected with its perform-
ance. The illustrations given above from Foelix and Fiore show the
disagreement between these two authors. If their conclusions were
examined in greater detail and compared with those of the other writers
subscribing to this doctrine, we would be forced to agree with Laurent
that "the distinction is so subtle as to be almost incomprehensible."''8
The vast majority of modern writers have reached the conclusion that
no distinction can be made on principle between the direct and indirect
consequences, or the effects resulting from the contract on the one hand
and those resulting from non-performance on the other.3 9 A. Rolin
voices their opinion when he says in substance:
"The above distinction has been overthrown by modem science as too
vague and too difficult of application." 40
The contention has been made that there is a fundamental difference
between the primary rights and duties arising from a contract and the
"7 Laurent, op. cit., 552.
"Aubry (1896) 23 CLuNEV, 731 ff.; Audinet, op. Cit., 292; Bossion, op. cit.,
244 ff.; Chausse (1886) 35 REVUE CaITIguE, 693-694; 2 Cdnde y Luque, Derecho
Internacional Privado (1907) 311 ff.; Despagnet, op. cit., 897 if.; Dreyfus,
op. cit., 367; Gabba (I9o8) 22 ANNUA E, 264; Gestoso y Acosta, Curson Ele-
mental de Derecho Internacional Privado (1900) 477; 7 Laurent, op. cit., 552;
Harburger (1902) 1g ANNUAIME, 137; Pillet, CoUrs, 331; Principes, 44o-44i;
i Rolin, op. cit., 524 ff.; Surville et Arthuys, op. cit., 301, 315 ff.
"' (i9o8) 22 ANNUAIE, 83.
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secondary duties arising from its breach. In the case of Healy v. Gor-
man,41 in which .the question related to the law governing the rate of
interest upon non-payment of a note which had been executed in New
York and was payable in New Jersey, the learned court used the
following language :42
"The contract did not carry interest upon the face of it, but upon
default of payment at the day and place, the law of this state tacitly
annexes an obligation thenceforth to pay interest until the debt is liqui-
dated ...... The contract itself was for payment at a day certain. It
did not contemplate a failure in the performance, and therefore made
no provisions in anticipation of. such an event; but left the law to take
its course in case of a breach of the contract. Since, therefore, the
event which gave rise to and legalizes the plaintiff's claim to interest,
happened in this state; or in other words, since it was here that the
right to interest accrued, and by operation of our law that it becomes
payable, the rate of interest must be such as is allowed in this state."
The same argument is advanced to show that the measure of damages
should be controlled by the law of the state in which the defendant
agreed to perform.48 This line of reasoning rests upon the so-called
territorial theory. In substance it amounts to this-the failure to
perform havitig occurred in the above case in the state of New Jersey,
the law of that state has an exclusive power to define'the consequences
that should attach to the breach of the contract. If the defendant had
been in New Jersey at the maturity of the note, and had declined to pay,
the territorial power of the state of New Jersey could, of course, in
accordance with the traditional Anglo-American theory, impose upon
the defendant the duty to pay damages for non-payment. Again, if the
defendant had been a citizen of New Jersey, the personal relationship
between him and the state might, consistently with Anglo-American
views, suffice to confer upon the state of New Jersey the power to impose
upon the defendant the duty to pay interest by way of damages. It
did not appear in the case, however, that the defendant was in the state
of New Jersey at the time o f the maturity of the note, or at any other
time or that he was a citizen of the state. The learned court does not
inquire into these facts, but considers the circumstance that the note
was payable in New Jersey as an event happening in New Jersey which
gave rise to the plaintiff's claim to interest. Applying Story's definition
of the territorial theory in its broadest possible form, it is difficult to see
how it can be stretched to include an "event" such as the above, i. e. a
41 (1836) I5 N. J. L. 328.
4Id., 329.
"Professor Beale commenting upon the decision of Atwood v. Walker, 179
Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 558, says: ". . . . The court intimated that where they
are different the measure of damages, like the obligation of the contract itself, is
determined by the law of the place of making. This notion seems to lose sight
of the fact that the right to damages forms no part of the original obligation, and
is created, not by the contract, but by the law upon breach of the contract." 4
Sedgwick, Damages (gth ed. 1912) 2759, note.
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mere failure to pay a note which the defendant had executed in
another state. The reasoning of the court in Healy v. Gorman, above
quoted, is another illustration tending to show that the so-called terri-
torial theory, instead of solving problems in the conflict of laws, leads
only to muddled thinking on the subject.
In reality the question is whether the law of the forum on grounds
of policy should incorporate the rate of interest or the measure of
damages governing in the state in which the defendant agreed to pay or
to perform, or in which the breach actually occurred, or whether these
matters should be determined by the law governing the contract in
general. Which rule should the forum prescribe when the parties are
silent on the subject? In favor of the application of the law of the
place of performance or of the place in which the breach occurred it has
been argued that, in as much as the rule governing contracts in general
rests upon the probable intention of the parties, it is inapplicable to the
consequences resulting from non-performance, because the parties
cannot be deemed to have contracted with reference to its breach."
The great majority of the courts and writers4 5 in recent years agree,
however, with Laurent when he says: "One cannot think of perform-
ance without thinking at the same time of non-performance." 4  So far
as the parties think about the legal consequences cf their contract Lau-
rent's statement is no doubt correct. Actually the parties rarely think
about the legal consequences of their acts. If the consequences resulting
from the execution of a contract are controlled on grounds of policy by
the law governing the contract, although they were not present to the
minds of the parties, similar considerations of policy may suggest that
the consequences resulting from non-performance should be governed
by the same law. It is possible, on the other hand, that, with regard
to the latter, other considerations of policy may require the application
of the law of the place of performance. The writer believes that such
considerations exist in the matter of moratory interest. Most countries
have adopted a legal rate of interest as the measure of damages for the
payment of money, representing the average value of money in such
country. As the value of the money at the place where it was agreed to
be paid represents, in the normal case, plaintiff's loss, the legal rate pre-
vailing at that place should control.47  The same argument does not
apply, however, to the measure of damages for the breach of contracts
other than those calling for the payment of money. The rules of
damages of the different countries arise from considerations of a purely
juridical order, and do not represent differences in the economic value
" i Foelix, op. Cit., 252; i Fiore, op. cit., 186.
"Audinet, op. cit., 292; Bossion, op. cit., 261; Chausse (x886) 35 REvuE
CRITIQUE, 693-694; Despagnet, op. cit., 899; Dreyfus, op. cit., 369, 370; Jettel,
op. cit., io8; Pillet, Cours, 331; Principes, 44o-44i; i Rolin, op. cit., 524; 527.
7 Laurent, op. cit., 556-557.4 Lorenzen, op. cit., supra, note I5, at p. 172; 3 Fiore, op. cit., 258.
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of plaintiff's contract in those countries. From the standpoint of justice
there is no apparent reason, therefore, why a contract that is governed
in general respects by the law of the place of contracting should be
subject as regards the measure of damages to the law of the place of
performance.
4 1
The rules that should govern the effects of contracts may be sum-
maiized as follows:
(i) The effects of contracts are governed by the law of any state
chosen by the parties.
(2) If the intention of the parties is not expressed, the effects of
contracts shall be governed by the law of the specified place
of performance.
(3) If the intention of the parties does not appear and no place
of performance is specified the law of the place of contract-
ing shall control.
(4) The law so governing determines not only the primary rights
and duties arising from the contract but also the secondary
rights arising from its breach.
However, the legal rate of interest for the non-payment of
money shall be determined by the law of the place of pay-
ment.
(5) The mode of performance is governed by the law and usages
of the place of performance.
(6) Where the effect of a contract depends upon the meaning of
certain terms designating the price, weight, or measure, or
the time of performance, reference shall be had to the
terminology of the place of performance, unless it appears
from the circumstances that the parties used them in a
different sense.
" Asser, op. cit., 81; Audinet, op. Cit., 292; Baudry-Lacantinerie & Barde,
Trait Tkiorique et Pratique de Droit Civil, tit. Obligations (195o) no. 497;
Chausse (i886) 35 R1vuz ClTIQuE, 693-694; 2 Conde y Luque, op. cit., 33;
Despagnet, op. cit., 912; 3 Diena, Trattato, 209; 7 Laurent, op. cit., 556; Otto-
lenghi, op. cit., 469; Pillet, Cours, 331; I Rolin, op. cit., 527-528; Surville &
Arthuys, op. cit., 738-739. But compare 3 Lyon-Caen et Renault, op. cit., no. 35.
